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Blueprint
The test is 100 multiple-choice questions in 50 minutes, so you get 30 seconds per question. Three areas carry 20 questions each and make up 60% of the score: Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities, Security and Design, and Security Protocols and Threat Mitigation. Study those first.
| # | Test area | Questions | Share | Practice bank | Security+ SY0- 801 objectives | MBA Research PIs (Business Administration Core) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Security Fundamentals | 15 | 15% | 30 | 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, 4.1, 4.5 | OP:441, OP:064, OP:152 |
| 2 | Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities | 20 | 20% | 40 | 2.1 to 2.6 | CO:202, FI:073, OP:153 |
| 3 | Security and Design | 20 | 20% | 40 | 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 5.5 | NF:083, NF:084, OP:064, OP:209, RM:069 |
| 4 | Network and Data Security | 15 | 15% | 30 | 1.3, 3.3, 4.5 | OP:064, OP:441, EI:103 |
| 5 | Security Operations and Management | 10 | 10% | 20 | 1.2, 3.4, 4.1, 5.1 | OP:152, OP:010, SM:075, RM:068 |
| 6 | Security Protocols and Threat Mitigation | 20 | 20% | 40 | 1.3, 3.2, 4.1, 4.3, 4.5, 5.5, 5.6 | OP:064, OP:152, OP:013, FI:073 |
| Total | 100 | 200 |
How the tags work. Every section and question carries three codes:
1. Objective code (for example SF-3 ): the test area plus the objective number from the official study guide. This is the most direct link to what gets tested.
2. Security+ objective (for example Sec+ 4.5 ): CompTIA Security+ SY0-801, the industry standard for entry-level security. It launched November 17, 2026. The event guidelines cite the older SY0-701 objectives, and the content overlaps almost completely.
3. MBA Research PI (for example OP:064 ): the closest Business Administration Core performance indicator. The event guidelines list no MBA Research PIs, and MBA Research has no technical security indicators (nothing on ciphers, firewalls, or malware types). These codes mark the business side of each topic, so read them as the nearest fit, not an official alignment.
| MBA Research PI | What it covers |
|---|---|
| OP:064 | Maintain data security |
| OP:152 | Follow established security procedures and policies |
| OP:153 | Protect company information and intangibles |
| OP:441 | Information privacy, security, and confidentiality in business |
| OP:013 | Routine security precautions |
| OP:010 | Handle and report emergency situations |
| CO:202 | How digital communications expose a business to risk |
| FI:073 | Protect against identity theft |
| EI:103 | Maintain the confidentiality of others |
| NF:083 / NF:084 | Role of information systems / principles of computer systems |
| SM:075 / RM:068 / RM:069 | Risk management / coordinating contingency plans / evaluating contingency plans |
| OP:209 | Restart and recover after failures such as a system crash or virus |
| OP:154 | Identify potential security issues |
Pacing plan. First pass: answer everything you know in 35 minutes and flag the rest. Second pass: 10 minutes on flagged questions. Last 5 minutes: fill every blank, because a blank is a guaranteed zero.
1. Security Fundamentals (15 questions)
This area tests the vocabulary every other area builds on. Expect scenario questions that ask which principle a control supports or which principle an incident broke.
CIA triad SF-1 Sec+ 1.1 OP:441
| Principle | Question it answers | Broken by | Protected by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Can only the right people read it? | Data leak, shoulder surfing, sniffing | Encryption, access control, data masking |
| Integrity | Is it unchanged and accurate? | Tampering, unauthorized edits, corrupted file | Hashing, digital signatures, version control |
| Availability | Can authorized users get to it when needed? | DDoS, ransomware, power loss, failed disk | Backups, RAID, UPS, redundancy, load balancing |
Trap: Ransomware feels like a confidentiality attack, but the classic answer is availability (you are locked out of your own data). If the scenario adds "the attacker also leaked the files," then confidentiality is hit too. Hashing protects integrity, not confidentiality: a hash does not hide data, it detects changes.
Digital trust SF-2 Sec+ 4.5, 1.3 OP:441
| Term | Plain meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Identity proofing | Verifying a person is who they claim before an account is created | Uploading a driver's license plus a selfie to open a bank account |
| Non-repudiation | The sender cannot later deny they sent or signed it | A digitally signed contract (signed with the sender's private key) |
| Attestation | A trusted party or device vouches that something is genuine or in a known-good state | A TPM chip reporting that a laptop booted with untampered firmware |
Trap: Non-repudiation needs something only one person holds, so it comes from a private key signature . A shared password or a symmetric key cannot give non-repudiation, because more than one party has the secret.
AAA SF-3 Sec+ 4.5 OP:152
| Step | Question | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication | Who are you? Prove it. | Password plus a code from an app |
| Authorization | What are you allowed to do? | You may read payroll but not edit it |
| Accounting | What did you do? | Logs showing you opened payroll at 9:14 a.m. |
Order matters: you cannot authorize someone you have not authenticated. Identification (typing a username) is the claim; authentication is proving the claim. Accounting is also called auditing.
Zero Trust SF-4 Sec+ 3.2 OP:152
Zero Trust means never trust, always verify : no user or device is trusted because of where it sits on the network.
| Traditional (castle and moat) | Zero Trust |
|---|---|
| Inside the firewall = trusted | Location grants nothing |
| Log in once, roam freely | Every request is checked (continuous verification) |
| Flat internal network | Microsegmentation: small zones, each with its own checks |
| VPN gives broad access | Access granted per app, per session |
Zero Trust parts you may see named: the control plane decides (policy engine, policy administrator) and the data plane enforces (policy enforcement point). Adaptive identity means the decision changes with context, such as a login from a new country.
Trap: A VPN alone is not Zero Trust. A VPN encrypts the path but often trusts everyone once they are connected.
Deception and disruption SF-5 Sec+ 4.1 OP:153
| Tool | What it is | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Honeypot | One fake system that looks valuable | Lure attackers, study their methods, waste their time |
| Honeynet | A network of honeypots | Watch attackers move between systems |
| Honeyfile | A fake file with a tempting name (passwords.xlsx) | Any access triggers an alert, since no real user needs it |
| Honeytoken | Fake data, such as a bogus account or API key | Shows exactly where stolen data ends up |
| DNS sinkhole | Redirects requests for known-bad domains to a safe address | Cuts malware off from its command server |
Trap: Honeypots detect and study. They do not prevent attacks, and they should be isolated from real systems.
Binary, hexadecimal, decimal SF-6 Sec+ 1.3 OP:064
Computers store keys and hashes as bits. Hex is a short way to write bits: 1 hex digit = 4 bits , and 2 hex digits = 1 byte .
| Decimal | Binary | Hex |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0000 | 0 |
| 9 | 1001 | 9 |
| 10 | 1010 | A |
| 11 | 1011 | B |
| 12 | 1100 | C |
| 13 | 1101 | D |
| 14 | 1110 | E |
| 15 | 1111 | F |
Worked example 1: binary to decimal. Add the place values where there is a 1.
Worked example 2: hex to decimal. Each hex place is worth 16 times the place to its right.
Worked example 3: hex to binary. Convert each hex digit to 4 bits and line them up: A3 = 1010 0011.
Worked example 4: hash length. A SHA-256 hash is 256 bits. Since each hex character holds 4 bits:
| Hash | Bits | Hex characters | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| MD5 | 128 | 32 | Broken (collisions) |
| SHA-1 | 160 | 40 | Deprecated |
| SHA-256 | 256 | 64 | Current standard |
Worked example 5: key space. An n-bit key has 2ⁿ possible values. Adding one bit doubles the work for a brute-force attacker:
So a 256-bit key is not "twice as strong" as a 128-bit key; it is 2¹²⁸ times harder to brute-force.
XOR (exclusive or) is the bit operation inside stream ciphers and one-time pads: output is 1 only when the two bits differ.
| A | B | A XOR B |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 |
Example: 1010 XOR 0110 = 1100. XOR the result with the same key again and you get the original back: 1100 XOR 0110 = 1010. That is why the same key both encrypts and decrypts.
Least privilege SF-7 Sec+ 1.1, 4.5 OP:152
Give each user, app, or service the minimum access needed to do the job, for only as long as needed .
| Look-alike | Difference |
|---|---|
| Least privilege | Minimum permissions for one person or process |
| Need to know | Even with clearance, you see only the data your task requires |
| Separation of duties | One task split between people so no one can commit fraud alone (one person orders, another approves payment) |
| Job rotation | People rotate roles so fraud gets noticed |
| Privilege creep | Permissions piling up as someone changes jobs; fixed by access reviews |
Trap: A daily-use admin account breaks least privilege even if the person is trustworthy. The fix is a standard account for daily work and a separate admin account used only when needed (or just-in-time access through privileged access management).
2. Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities (20 questions)
This is the biggest "name that attack" area. Most questions describe what happened and ask you to identify it, so learn the one detail that separates each look-alike.
Web and software vulnerabilities CT-1 Sec+ 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 CO:202
| Attack | What happens | Tell-tale clue | Main fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| SQL injection | Input is run as a database command | ' OR 1=1 -- in a login box | Parameterized queries, input validation |
| Command injection | Input is run as an operating system command | ; rm -rf or && whoami in a form field | Input validation, least privilege |
| Cross-site scripting (XSS) | Attacker's script runs in other users' browsers | <script> in a comment or URL | Output encoding, input validation |
| Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) | A logged-in user's browser is tricked into sending a request | Hidden form makes your bank transfer money | Anti-CSRF tokens |
| Buffer overflow | Input is longer than the memory set aside, overwriting nearby memory | Long string of A's, program crashes or runs attacker code | Bounds checking, memory-safe languages, ASLR |
| Race condition (TOCTOU) | The system checks something, then uses it, and the attacker swaps it in between | "Time of check to time of use" | Locking, atomic operations |
| Jailbreaking / rooting | Removing a phone's built-in restrictions | Apps installed from outside the official store | Mobile device management (MDM) blocks jailbroken devices |
| AI prompt injection | Hidden instructions make an AI model ignore its rules | "Ignore previous instructions" inside a document the AI reads | Input filtering, limiting what the AI can access |
Trap: SQL injection attacks the server's database . XSS attacks the other users who view the page. If the victim is a website visitor, think XSS.
Threat actors CT-2 Sec+ 2.2 OP:153
| Actor | Resources and skill | Typical motivation |
|---|---|---|
| Nation-state (often an APT) | Highest; well funded, patient | Espionage, war, disrupting infrastructure |
| Organized crime | High; run like a business | Money (ransomware, fraud, data theft) |
| Hacktivist | Varies | Political or social message (defacing sites, leaks) |
| Insider threat | Already has access | Revenge, money, or simple carelessness |
| Unskilled attacker (script kiddie) | Low; uses others' tools | Thrills, bragging rights |
| Shadow IT | Not malicious; employees using unapproved tech | Convenience, which still creates risk |
Attributes to compare: internal vs. external , resources and funding , and level of sophistication . An APT (advanced persistent threat) stays hidden inside a network for months.
Trap: The insider with legitimate access is often the hardest to detect, because their activity looks normal.
Types of viruses CT-3 Sec+ 2.5 OP:064
A virus needs a host file and a user action to spread.
| Virus type | Defining trait |
|---|---|
| File infector | Attaches to executable programs |
| Boot sector | Infects the startup area of a drive and loads before the operating system |
| Macro | Hides in document macros (Word, Excel) |
| Polymorphic | Changes its code (encryption) with each infection to dodge signatures |
| Metamorphic | Rewrites its entire code each time; harder still to detect |
| Stealth | Hides its changes from antivirus scans |
| Multipartite | Spreads several ways at once (boot sector and files) |
| Fileless | Lives in memory or uses built-in tools like PowerShell; leaves almost no file to scan |
| Armored | Built to resist analysis and reverse engineering |
Trap: Polymorphic vs. metamorphic. Polymorphic changes its "wrapper" (encryption) but keeps the same core; metamorphic rewrites the core itself.
Types of vulnerabilities CT-4 Sec+ 2.4 OP:064
| Vulnerability | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Zero-day | A flaw the vendor does not know about yet, so no patch exists |
| Unpatched software | A fix exists but has not been installed (most common real-world cause of breaches) |
| Backdoor | A hidden way in that skips normal login; planted by attackers or left by developers |
| Misconfiguration | Default passwords, open ports, public cloud storage buckets |
| End of life (EOL) / legacy | The vendor no longer releases patches |
| Supply chain | A trusted vendor's product or update is compromised |
Trap: A zero-day is defined by no patch available . Once the vendor releases a fix, a system missing it is "unpatched," not a zero-day.
Social engineering CT-5 Sec+ 2.3, 2.5 CO:202 FI:073
| Attack | Channel | Distinguishing detail |
|---|---|---|
| Phishing | Mass message, generic greeting | |
| Spear phishing | Aimed at a specific person or group, uses personal details | |
| Whaling | Spear phishing aimed at an executive | |
| Business email compromise (BEC) | Uses a real or spoofed executive account to request a wire transfer | |
| Vishing | Voice call | "This is IT support, I need your password" |
| Smishing | Text message | Fake delivery or bank link by SMS |
| Pretexting | Any | Attacker invents a believable story or role first |
| Watering hole | Website | Infects a site the target group already visits |
| Typosquatting | Website | Registers a misspelled domain (gooogle.com) |
| Tailgating / piggybacking | Physical | Following someone through a secure door (piggybacking = with their consent) |
| Shoulder surfing | Physical | Watching someone type a PIN |
| Dumpster diving | Physical | Searching trash for documents |
Social engineering works through urgency, authority, fear, scarcity, familiarity, and trust . The best defense is security awareness training.
Trap: Whaling is about who is targeted (executives); vishing and smishing are about the channel (voice, SMS). A phone call to a CEO could be both.
DDoS attacks CT-6 Sec+ 2.5 OP:153
A DoS comes from one source; a DDoS comes from many (usually a botnet of infected devices). The goal is availability loss.
| Type | Target | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Volumetric | Bandwidth | UDP flood filling the internet connection |
| Protocol | Server or firewall connection tables | SYN flood: half-open TCP handshakes never completed |
| Application layer | A specific service | Thousands of HTTP requests to a search page |
| Amplification / reflection | Uses third-party servers | Small spoofed DNS query triggers a large reply sent to the victim |
Mitigations: upstream DDoS protection or a CDN, rate limiting, blackholing bad traffic, extra capacity.
Trap: In a reflection attack the traffic arrives from legitimate servers , so blocking "the attacker's IP" does not work; the source address was spoofed.
Malware types CT-7 Sec+ 2.5 OP:064
| Malware | Self-spreading? | Needs user action? | Key trait |
|---|---|---|---|
| Virus | Yes, through files | Yes | Attaches to a host file |
| Worm | Yes, across networks | No | Exploits a flaw to copy itself |
| Trojan | No | Yes | Pretends to be useful software |
| RAT (remote access Trojan) | No | Yes | Gives the attacker remote control |
| Ransomware | Sometimes | Usually | Encrypts data and demands payment |
| Spyware | No | Usually | Secretly collects information |
| Keylogger | No | Usually | Records keystrokes |
| Rootkit | No | Usually | Hides deep in the OS, often with admin (root) rights; hides other malware |
| Logic bomb | No | No | Waits for a trigger (date or event), often planted by an insider |
| Bloatware / adware | No | No | Unwanted preinstalled apps or ads |
Trap: The difference between a worm and a virus is the user action. "Spread to 2,000 computers overnight with no one opening anything" is a worm .
Cryptographic attacks CT-8 Sec+ 2.5 OP:064
| Attack | What it does |
|---|---|
| Downgrade | Forces the connection to use an older, weaker protocol or cipher (SSL stripping removes HTTPS entirely) |
| Collision | Finds two different inputs that produce the same hash, so a forged file can pass a hash check |
| Birthday attack | Uses probability to find a collision far faster than brute force |
| Brute force / dictionary | Tries every key, or a list of likely passwords |
| Pass-the-hash | Reuses a stolen password hash without cracking it |
Worked example: the birthday bound. In a room of just 23 people, there is about a 50% chance two share a birthday. Hashes work the same way: for an n-bit hash, a collision becomes likely after about
So a 128-bit hash (MD5) needs about 2⁶⁴ tries, not 2¹²⁸. That is why longer hashes like SHA- 256 (2¹²⁸ for a collision) are used.
Trap: A collision breaks integrity checks. It does not reveal the original data.
Wireless vulnerabilities CT-9 Sec+ 2.3, 2.4 OP:064
| Attack | What happens |
|---|---|
| Evil twin | A fake access point copies a real network's name (SSID) to capture traffic |
| Rogue access point | An unauthorized AP plugged into the real network, often by an employee |
| Deauthentication | Forces users off the network, often to push them onto an evil twin |
| WEP cracking | WEP's weak design lets keys be recovered in minutes |
| WPS PIN attack | The 8-digit setup PIN can be brute-forced |
| Jamming | Radio interference that blocks wireless use (availability) |
| Bluejacking | Sending unsolicited messages over Bluetooth (annoying, low risk) |
| Bluesnarfing | Stealing data over Bluetooth |
| RFID / NFC skimming | Reading badges or contactless cards from close range |
Trap: Evil twin vs. rogue AP. The evil twin is the attacker's device imitating a network; the rogue AP is an unauthorized device connected to your network , often installed by an insider for convenience.
3. Security and Design (20 questions)
This area asks how to build systems that stay secure and keep running. Expect "which design best" questions and the two calculation types below: RAID capacity and backup restores.
Cloud infrastructure SD-1 Sec+ 3.1 NF:083
The shared responsibility model decides who secures what. The more the provider manages, the less you secure.
| Model | Provider secures | Customer secures | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| IaaS | Physical data center, hardware, virtualization | OS, patches, apps, data, access | Renting virtual servers |
| PaaS | All of the above plus OS and runtime | Your code, data, access | App hosting platform |
| SaaS | Nearly everything | Your data and user access | Web email, online office apps |
Trap: In every model, the customer is still responsible for its data and who has access . A misconfigured public storage bucket is the customer's fault, not the provider's.
| Deployment | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Public | Shared provider infrastructure |
| Private | Used by one organization |
| Hybrid | Mix of public and private, connected |
| Community | Shared by organizations with common needs |
Other terms: infrastructure as code (IaC) defines servers in scripts, so every build is identical and reviewable. Serverless runs functions without managing servers. A CASB (cloud access security broker) sits between users and cloud apps to enforce policy.
Microservices SD-2 Sec+ 3.1 NF:084
An app split into many small services that talk over APIs.
| Security upside | Security downside |
|---|---|
| A breach in one service can be contained | Many more API endpoints = larger attack surface |
| Each service gets only the permissions it needs | Service-to-service traffic must be authenticated and encrypted |
| Services can be patched independently | Logging and monitoring are spread across many places |
Controls: an API gateway as one front door, authentication between services, rate limiting, and central logging.
Logical vs. physical segmentation SD-3 Sec+ 3.2 OP:064
| Type | How | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Physical | Separate hardware and cabling | Air gap: a system with no network connection at all |
| Logical | Software rules on shared hardware | VLANs, subnets, firewall rules, ACLs |
A screened subnet (formerly DMZ) holds public-facing servers, like a web server, between the internet and the internal network. If the web server is breached, the attacker still faces another firewall.
Trap: VLANs separate traffic logically . Two VLANs on the same switch are still on the same physical hardware.
Virtualization and containers SD-4 Sec+ 3.1, 4.1 NF:084
| Virtual machine | Container | |
|---|---|---|
| Includes | A full guest operating system | Only the app and its libraries |
| Shares | The hypervisor | The host's OS kernel |
| Isolation | Stronger | Lighter (a kernel flaw affects every container) |
| Speed | Slower to start | Starts in seconds |
Security gains: isolation (a compromised app stays boxed in), snapshots to roll back to a clean state, and sandboxing to test suspicious files safely.
Risks: VM escape (breaking out of a VM to reach the host or other VMs) and VM sprawl (forgotten, unpatched VMs).
IoT and embedded systems SD-5 Sec+ 2.3, 3.1 OP:064
| IoT risk | Why it happens |
|---|---|
| Default passwords | Shipped with admin/admin and never changed |
| Rarely patched | Many devices have no easy update process |
| Weak or no encryption | Limited processing power and battery |
| Botnet recruitment | Millions of weak devices make huge DDoS botnets |
| Physical access | Devices sit in public or unguarded places |
Fixes: change default credentials, put IoT on its own network segment , update firmware, and disable unused features. ICS/SCADA (industrial control systems running utilities and factories) often cannot be patched quickly, so they rely on segmentation.
Backups, RAID, and power SD-6 Sec+ 3.4 OP:209
Backup types. Assume a full backup on Sunday and a failure on Thursday morning.
| Type | Backs up | Backup speed | Restore needs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Full | Everything | Slowest | The full backup only |
| Incremental | Changes since the last backup of any kind | Fastest | Full + every incremental (Mon, Tue, Wed) |
| Differential | Changes since the last full | Medium, grows daily | Full + the latest differential (Wed) |
| Snapshot | System state at a moment | Very fast | That snapshot |
Trap: Incremental = fast backup, slow restore. Differential = slower backup, fast restore. Memory hook: differential keeps growing (it differs more from the full each day).
3-2-1 rule: 3 copies of data, on 2 types of media, 1 copy offsite (and ideally one offline or immutable to survive ransomware).
RAID spreads data across disks. It provides availability, not a backup: if a file is deleted or encrypted by ransomware, every disk gets the same change.
| RAID | Method | Minimum disks | Survives | Usable space |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Striping | 2 | No disk failures | All disks |
| 1 | Mirroring | 2 | 1 failure | Half |
| 5 | Striping with parity | 3 | 1 failure | All but one disk |
| 6 | Striping with double parity | 4 | 2 failures | All but two disks |
| 10 (1+0) | Mirrored stripes | 4 | 1 per mirror pair | Half |
Worked example: RAID capacity. Five 4 TB disks.
Power. A UPS (battery) covers short outages and gives time for a clean shutdown or for the generator to start. A generator covers long outages. Surge protectors and line conditioners handle spikes and dips.
Recovery metrics.
| Metric | Question | Example |
|---|---|---|
| RPO (recovery point objective) | How much data can we afford to lose? | Backups every 4 hours means up to 4 hours of data lost |
| RTO (recovery time objective) | How long can we be down? | Systems must be back within 2 hours |
| MTTR (mean time to repair) | Average time to fix after a failure | 3 hours |
| MTBF (mean time between failures) | Average uptime between failures (higher is better) | 10,000 hours |
Trap: RPO looks back at data; RTO looks forward at downtime.
CIA in network design SD-7 Sec+ 3.2 OP:064
| Goal | Design choices |
|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Encryption in transit and at rest, segmentation, access control lists, VPNs |
| Integrity | Hashing, file integrity monitoring, digital signatures, change control |
| Availability | Redundant links and power, load balancers, clustering, failover, hot or warm sites |
Recovery sites: hot = fully running copy, ready in minutes (most expensive); warm = hardware ready, data needs loading (hours to days); cold = space and power only (days to weeks, cheapest).
Fail-open vs. fail-closed: when a security device fails, fail-closed blocks all traffic (protects confidentiality), fail-open lets all traffic through (protects availability).
Testing in secure architecture SD-8 Sec+ 3.4, 5.5 RM:069
| Test | What it is | Disruption |
|---|---|---|
| Tabletop exercise | Team talks through a scenario around a table | None |
| Walkthrough | Step-by-step review of the plan | None |
| Simulation | Practice a realistic scenario without touching production | Low |
| Parallel processing | Run the backup site alongside the primary and compare | Low |
| Failover test | Actually switch to the backup systems | High |
Code testing: static analysis reads source code without running it; dynamic analysis tests the running program; fuzzing sends random or malformed input to find crashes. Vulnerability scans find known weaknesses; penetration tests try to exploit them (see Area 6).
Trap: A tabletop exercise is discussion only . If systems are actually switched over, it is a failover test.
4. Network and Data Security (15 questions)
This area is mostly cryptography and access control. The single most tested idea: which key does what in public key cryptography.
Purpose of cryptography ND-1 Sec+ 1.3 OP:441
| Tool | Reversible? | Uses a key? | Protects |
|---|---|---|---|
| Encryption | Yes, with the key | Yes | Confidentiality |
| Hashing | No (one-way) | No | Integrity |
| Digital signature | Verifiable | Yes (private key signs) | Integrity, authentication, non-repudiation |
| Encoding (Base64) | Yes, by anyone | No | Nothing; it only changes format |
Trap: Base64 is encoding, not encryption. Anyone can decode it.
Symmetric vs. asymmetric ND-2 Sec+ 1.3 OP:064
| Symmetric (private key / secret key) | Asymmetric (public key) | |
|---|---|---|
| Keys | One shared secret key | A key pair: public + private |
| Speed | Fast; good for large data | Slow; good for small data and key exchange |
| Main problem | Sharing the key safely | Slower, more computing power |
| Algorithms | AES (current standard), DES and 3DES (outdated), ChaCha20 | RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman (key exchange) |
Which key does what. Memorize this table.
| Goal | Sender uses | Receiver uses |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (only Bob can read it) | Bob's public key to encrypt | Bob's private key to decrypt |
| Digital signature (prove Alice sent it) | Alice's private key to sign | Alice's public key to verify |
Hook: encrypt to the receiver, sign as yourself.
Hybrid encryption (how HTTPS works): asymmetric cryptography safely exchanges a symmetric session key, then fast symmetric encryption protects the actual data.
Worked example: how many keys? A group of n people who each need private two-way communication.
For 10 people:
Trap: "Private key cryptography" usually means symmetric encryption, while the "private key" in a key pair belongs to asymmetric encryption. Read the question's wording closely.
Shift, Caesar, and substitution ciphers ND-3 Sec+ 1.3 OP:064
| Cipher | How it works | Key | Weakness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shift | Every letter moves the same number of places | The shift number | Only 25 useful keys; brute-force by hand |
| Caesar | A shift cipher with a shift of 3 | 3 | Same as shift |
| ROT13 | Shift of 13; applying it twice returns the original | 13 | Same as shift |
| Substitution | Each letter swaps for another letter by a scrambled alphabet | The scrambled alphabet | Frequency analysis (E, T, A are most common in English) |
| Transposition | Letters stay the same but are rearranged | The pattern | Letter frequencies are unchanged |
Number the letters A = 0 through Z = 25. Encryption and decryption with shift k:
Worked example 1: encrypt. HELLO with a Caesar shift of 3: H→K, E→H, L→O, L→O, O→R, so the ciphertext is KHOOR .
Worked example 2: wrap around. Y with shift 3: Y = 24, and
Worked example 3: decrypt. Ciphertext FDW with shift 3: F→C, D→A, W→T, so the message is CAT .
Worked example 4: key space. A shift cipher has only 25 useful keys. A simple substitution cipher has
yet it still falls to frequency analysis, because a big key space does not help when the letter patterns leak through.
Trap: Substitution changes which letters appear; transposition changes the order . If the ciphertext uses exactly the same letters as the message, rearranged, it is transposition.
Three states of data ND-4 Sec+ 3.3 OP:064
| State | Where the data is | Main protection |
|---|---|---|
| At rest | Stored on a disk, database, USB drive, backup | Full-disk encryption, database encryption, access control |
| In transit (in motion) | Moving across a network | TLS/HTTPS, VPN (IPsec), SSH |
| In use | Loaded in memory (RAM) or CPU being processed | Secure enclaves, memory protection, limited access |
Trap: A stolen laptop is a data-at-rest problem (fix: full-disk encryption). Someone sniffing Wi-Fi is a data-in-transit problem (fix: TLS or a VPN). Data in use is the hardest to protect, because it must be decrypted to be processed.
Data classifications you may see: public, private/internal, sensitive, confidential, restricted, critical. Data types: PII (personally identifiable information), PHI (health information), financial, intellectual property, trade secrets.
Access control models ND-5 Sec+ 4.5 EI:103
| Model | Who decides access | Clue in a question | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAC (mandatory) | The system, based on labels set by administrators | Security clearances: Top Secret, Secret | Military, government |
| DAC (discretionary) | The owner of the file | "The owner shares it with whoever they choose" | Sharing a personal folder |
| RBAC (role-based) | The person's job role | "All nurses can view charts" | Most businesses |
| Rule-based | Rules set by an admin, applied to everyone | "No logins after 7 p.m." | Firewall rules, time restrictions |
| ABAC (attribute-based) | A mix of attributes: user, resource, location, time, device | "Managers in the U.S., on company devices, during work hours" | Zero Trust environments |
Trap: DAC is the most flexible and the least secure. MAC is the most strict. "Owner decides" always signals DAC.
Network authentication and authorization ND-6 Sec+ 4.5 OP:152
Authentication factors. True MFA needs two different categories .
| Factor | Category | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Something you know | Knowledge | Password, PIN, security question |
| Something you have | Possession | Phone app code, hardware token, smart card |
| Something you are | Inherence | Fingerprint, face, retina |
| Somewhere you are | Location | GPS or IP-based location check |
Trap: A password plus a security question is not MFA. Both are something you know.
| Term | What it does |
|---|---|
| TOTP | Code that changes every 30 seconds (authenticator apps) |
| HOTP | Code that changes each time it is used (counter-based) |
| Digital certificate | Proves a device or user owns a public key; used for logins and 802.1X |
| SSO (single sign-on) | One login gives access to many apps |
| Federation | Trust between organizations, so one company's login works at another |
| SAML | Exchanges authentication data for web SSO |
| OAuth | Authorization: lets an app access your data without your password ("Sign in with..." granting permissions) |
| OpenID Connect | Authentication layer built on OAuth |
| Kerberos | Ticket-based authentication in Windows domains |
| RADIUS / TACACS+ | Central authentication servers for network access; TACACS+ encrypts the whole packet |
| 802.1X | Port-based network access control: device must authenticate before getting network access |
Trap: OAuth is about authorization (what an app may do), not authentication. The protocol that adds authentication is OpenID Connect.
Hashing and blockchain ND-7 Sec+ 1.3 OP:064
A good hash is one-way , fixed length (any input gives the same size output), and shows the avalanche effect (change one character and the whole hash changes).
| Use | How hashing helps |
|---|---|
| File integrity | Compare the downloaded file's hash with the published hash |
| Password storage | Store the hash, never the password; add a salt (random value) so identical passwords produce different hashes and rainbow tables fail |
| Key stretching | Hash many times on purpose (bcrypt, PBKDF2) to slow down cracking |
| Blockchain | Each block contains the previous block's hash, so changing an old block breaks every link after it |
A blockchain is a distributed, public ledger: many computers hold copies, and the chain of hashes makes tampering obvious. This gives integrity without one trusted central authority.
Trap: A salt is not secret and is stored next to the hash. Its job is to make each hash unique, not to be hidden. A pepper is the secret value kept separately.
5. Security Operations and Management (10 questions)
The smallest area, but its questions are very predictable: match the policy to the situation, pick the firewall, and read a rule list from the top down.
Security policies SO-1 Sec+ 5.1 OP:152
| Policy | Answers | Example situation |
|---|---|---|
| Acceptable use policy (AUP) | What employees may and may not do with company tech | An employee streams games on a work laptop |
| Information security policy | The organization's overall security goals and rules (the top-level policy) | Defines who owns security and how data is classified |
| Business continuity plan (BCP) | How the business keeps operating during a disruption | Staff work from a backup office during a flood |
| Disaster recovery plan (DRP) | How IT systems and data are restored after a disaster | Restoring servers at a warm site |
| Incident response plan (IRP) | What to do when a security incident happens | Steps to follow when ransomware is found |
| Change management policy | How changes are requested, approved, and tested | Patching a production server |
| Data retention policy | How long data is kept and when it is destroyed | Emails kept for 7 years |
| BYOD policy | Rules for personal devices used for work | Employee wants work email on a personal phone |
Trap: BCP vs. DRP. The BCP covers the whole business (people, processes, locations). The DRP is a part of continuity focused on technology .
Governance documents, strictest to most flexible:
| Document | Required? | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Policy | Yes; the high-level "what" and "why" | "All sensitive data must be encrypted." |
| Standard | Yes; specific required technology or value | "Use AES-256." |
| Procedure | Yes; the step-by-step "how" | "Step 1: open the encryption console..." |
| Guideline | No; recommended advice | "Consider using a password manager." |
Disaster prevention and recovery planning SO-2 Sec+ 3.4, 4.7, 5.2 OP:010
Planning order. A business impact analysis (BIA) comes first: it finds the critical functions and sets the RTO and RPO for each (see Area 3). The plans are built from the BIA.
Incident response lifecycle:
1. Preparation : plans, tools, training, contact lists. 2. Detection / identification : confirm an incident is happening. 3. Analysis : scope, cause, and impact. 4. Containment : stop the spread (isolate the infected machine). Comes before eradication.
5. Eradication : remove the malware and close the hole. 6. Recovery : restore systems and watch for reinfection. 7. Lessons learned : review what happened and improve.
Trap: When malware is found, the first action is usually to contain it (disconnect from the network), not to delete it or wipe the machine. Wiping first destroys evidence and may miss other infected systems.
Risk math. Questions may ask whether a control is worth buying.
AV = asset value, EF = exposure factor (the percent of the asset lost per incident), SLE = single loss expectancy, ARO = annualized rate of occurrence (times per year), ALE = annualized loss expectancy.
Worked example. A $200,000 server room would lose 25% of its value in a flood. Floods happen about once every 4 years.
A flood barrier costing $20,000 per year costs more than the $12,500 expected yearly loss, so on cost alone it is not justified.
Trap: "Once every 4 years" is an ARO of 0.25, not 4. Divide 1 by the number of years.
Risk responses:
| Response | Meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Avoid | Stop the risky activity | Stop storing credit card numbers |
| Mitigate (reduce) | Add controls | Install a firewall |
| Transfer (share) | Shift the cost to someone else | Buy cyber insurance |
| Accept | Live with it, usually because the cost of fixing is higher | Low-value risk, documented and approved |
Firewall types SO-3 Sec+ 4.1 OP:064
| Type | Looks at | Best for |
|---|---|---|
| Packet filtering (stateless) | Each packet's IP addresses and ports, with no memory of earlier packets | Simple, fast filtering |
| Stateful | Tracks connections, so it knows if a reply belongs to a session that was started from inside | Most network perimeters |
| Next-generation firewall (NGFW) | Applications and content (layer 7), plus built-in intrusion prevention and user awareness | Blocking specific apps (allow a chat app, block its file transfer) |
| Web application firewall (WAF) | HTTP/HTTPS traffic to a web app | Stopping SQL injection and XSS against a website |
| Network-based | Traffic for a whole network segment | Perimeter protection |
| Host-based | Traffic in and out of one device | Laptops, individual servers |
| Proxy | Requests made on the user's behalf | Content filtering, hiding internal addresses |
Trap: A WAF protects a web application , not the whole network. If the question mentions SQL injection or XSS against a website, the answer is a WAF.
Firewall access lists and rules SO-4 Sec+ 4.1 OP:152
Rules are checked top to bottom , and the first match wins . Anything that matches no rule hits the implicit deny at the end.
Worked example. Rules on a firewall protecting a web server at 10.0.0.5:
| Order | Action | Source | Destination | Port |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Deny | 203.0.113.50 | Any | Any |
| 2 | Allow | Any | 10.0.0.5 | 443 (HTTPS) |
| 3 | Allow | 192.168.1.0/24 | 10.0.0.5 | 22 (SSH) |
| (implicit) | Deny | Any | Any | Any |
- 203.0.113.50 tries HTTPS to the server: denied (rule 1 matches first).
- An outside user tries HTTPS: allowed (rule 2).
- An outside user tries SSH: denied (no rule matches, so the implicit deny applies).
- 192.168.1.20 tries SSH: allowed (rule 3).
Trap: If an "Allow Any Any" rule sits at the top, every rule below it is useless. Specific rules go above general ones.
Common ports to know: 20/21 FTP, 22 SSH/SFTP, 23 Telnet (insecure), 25 SMTP, 53 DNS, 80 HTTP, 110 POP3, 143 IMAP, 443 HTTPS, 3389 RDP.
Messaging, email, and data security SO-5 Sec+ 4.1, 3.3 CO:202 OP:064
| Control | What it does |
|---|---|
| SPF | Lists which mail servers may send for a domain |
| DKIM | Digitally signs outgoing email so receivers can verify it was not altered |
| DMARC | Tells receivers what to do when SPF or DKIM fails (reject, quarantine) and sends reports |
| S/MIME and PGP | Encrypt and sign the message itself (end to end) |
| Email gateway | Filters spam, malware, and phishing before delivery |
| DLP (data loss prevention) | Blocks sensitive data, like Social Security numbers, from leaving by email or upload |
Best practices: verify unusual requests by a second channel (call the person at a known number), do not open unexpected attachments, encrypt sensitive messages, and classify data so people know how to handle it.
Secure disposal:
| Method | Works on | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Overwriting / wiping | Hard drives | Reusable afterward |
| Degaussing | Magnetic media (hard drives, tapes) | Does not work on SSDs; drive is usually unusable |
| Shredding / pulverizing | Any media | Physical destruction; most certain |
| Certificate of destruction | Outside disposal vendors | Proof the job was done |
Trap: Deleting a file or formatting a drive does not remove the data; it can be recovered.
Change management SO-6 Sec+ 1.2 OP:152
Uncontrolled changes are a major cause of outages and new vulnerabilities. A proper change process:
1. Request the change in writing. 2. Impact analysis : what could break, what is the risk. 3. Approval by the change advisory board (CAB) and the system owner. 4. Test in a non-production environment. 5. Schedule it during a maintenance window .
- Have a backout plan (how to undo it). 7. Document the change and update diagrams, version records, and procedures.
Trap: The backout plan is written before the change, not after something breaks. A change that skipped approval is a security problem even if it worked.
6. Security Protocols and Threat Mitigation (20 questions)
This area is about the fix: which protocol, which detection tool, which control. When a question names an insecure protocol, the answer is almost always its secure replacement.
Secure protocols SP-1 Sec+ 3.2, 4.1 OP:064
| Insecure (plain text) | Port | Secure replacement | Port |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telnet | 23 | SSH | 22 |
| HTTP | 80 | HTTPS (HTTP over TLS) | 443 |
| FTP | 20/21 | SFTP (over SSH) or FTPS (over TLS) | 22 / 990 |
| SNMP v1/v2 | 161 | SNMPv3 (adds encryption and authentication) | 161 |
| LDAP | 389 | LDAPS | 636 |
| POP3 / IMAP | 110 / 143 | POP3S / IMAPS | 995 / 993 |
| DNS | 53 | DNSSEC (adds integrity through signatures, not encryption) | 53 |
| SSL, early TLS | TLS 1.2 or 1.3 |
Wireless security, weakest to strongest:
| Protocol | Encryption | Status |
|---|---|---|
| WEP | RC4 | Broken; never use |
| WPA | TKIP | Outdated |
| WPA2 | AES (CCMP) | Widely used, secure with a strong passphrase |
| WPA3 | AES with SAE | Current best; resists offline password guessing |
WPA2/WPA3 Personal uses one shared passphrase (PSK). Enterprise gives each user their own login through 802.1X and a RADIUS server, so a departing employee's access can be removed alone.
IPsec (VPNs): AH gives integrity and authentication only; ESP adds encryption. Tunnel mode encrypts the whole packet (site-to-site VPNs); transport mode encrypts only the payload.
Trap: SSL is obsolete. Any modern "SSL certificate" actually runs TLS. And DNSSEC proves DNS answers are authentic; it does not hide them.
IDS and IPS SP-2 Sec+ 4.1, 4.4 OP:064
| IDS (intrusion detection) | IPS (intrusion prevention) | |
|---|---|---|
| Action | Detects and alerts | Detects and blocks |
| Placement | Passive: watches a copy of traffic (port mirror or network tap) | Inline: traffic flows through it |
| Risk if wrong | Missed alert | Blocks legitimate traffic |
| Detection method | How it works | Strength | Weakness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Signature-based | Matches known attack patterns | Few false positives | Misses zero-days |
| Anomaly / behavior-based | Learns a normal baseline, flags anything unusual | Can catch new attacks | More false positives |
| Heuristic | Rules about suspicious behavior | Catches variants | Needs tuning |
NIDS/NIPS watch the network; HIDS/HIPS run on one host.
| Result | Meaning | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| False positive | Alarm on harmless activity | Wastes time; an IPS blocks real users |
| False negative | No alarm on a real attack | The most dangerous result |
| True positive | Correct alarm | Working as intended |
| True negative | Correctly silent | Working as intended |
Trap: A brand-new attack with no known signature will slip past a signature-based system; anomaly-based detection is the better choice for unknown threats.
Policies against viruses, phishing, and email scams SP-3 Sec+ 4.1, 5.6
| Threat | Technical control | People and process control |
|---|---|---|
| Viruses and malware | Antivirus / EDR on every endpoint, application allow lists, disable Office macros by default | Do not install unapproved software |
| Phishing | Email filtering, link scanning, SPF/DKIM/DMARC, "external sender" banners | Awareness training and phishing simulations; a one-click report button |
| Payment and gift card scams (BEC) | Flag look-alike domains | Verify by a second channel: call a known number before any wire transfer; two-person approval |
| Identity theft | MFA on accounts, credit monitoring | Shred documents, never share SSNs by email |
Application allow list vs. deny list: an allow list runs only approved programs (stronger); a deny list blocks known-bad programs (misses anything new).
Trap: The best answer to "reduce successful phishing" is usually training plus a reporting process , because filters never catch every message.
Obfuscation SP-4 Sec+ 1.3, 3.3 OP:441
| Method | What it does | Reversible? | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tokenization | Replaces real data with a random token; the real value stays in a secure vault | Only through the vault | A store keeps token 8f3a-11c2 instead of your card number |
| Data masking | Hides part of the data on display | Not from the masked view | SSN shown as ***- **-6789 |
| Steganography | Hides data inside another file | Yes, if you know where to look | A message hidden in a photo's pixels |
| Encryption | Scrambles data with a key | Yes, with the key | AES-encrypted file |
| Anonymization | Removes identifiers permanently | No | Survey data with names deleted |
| Pseudonymization | Replaces identifiers with a code that can be linked back | Yes, with the key table | Patient 4471 instead of a name |
Trap: Tokenization vs. encryption. A token has no mathematical relationship to the original, so it cannot be "decrypted"; you need the vault. Steganography hides that a message exists ; encryption hides what it says .
Strong passwords SP-5 Sec+ 4.5 FI:073
The number of possible passwords is the character set size raised to the length:
where c is the number of possible characters and L is the length.
Worked example: length beats complexity.
A 12-letter lowercase password has more combinations than an 8-character password using every symbol on the keyboard. Each extra character multiplies the work by c.
Current best practices (in line with NIST guidance):
| Do | Avoid |
|---|---|
| Long passphrases (four or more random words) | Short passwords with forced symbols |
| A password manager with a unique password per site | Reusing passwords |
| Check new passwords against lists of breached passwords | Forced changes every 90 days with no sign of compromise |
| Account lockout or rate limiting | Password hints and security questions |
| MFA | Relying on the password alone |
| Attack | How it works | Best defense |
|---|---|---|
| Brute force | Tries every combination | Length, lockout |
| Dictionary | Tries common words and passwords | Passphrases of random words, breached-password checks |
| Password spraying | Tries one common password across many accounts (avoids lockouts) | MFA, banned-password lists |
| Credential stuffing | Uses username/password pairs stolen from another site | Unique passwords, MFA |
| Rainbow table | Precomputed hashes | Salting |
Trap: Spraying vs. stuffing. Spraying guesses a common password; stuffing reuses real stolen credentials.
Digital certificates and Certificate Authorities SP-6 Sec+ 1.3 OP:441
A digital certificate binds a public key to an identity, and a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) signs it to vouch for that link.
| Certificate field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Subject | Who the certificate belongs to (www.example.com) |
| Public key | The subject's public key |
| Issuer | The CA that signed it |
| Validity period | Start and expiration dates |
| Serial number | Unique ID, used for revocation |
| CA's digital signature | Proof the CA issued it |
Chain of trust: root CA (built into your browser or OS) → intermediate CA → your server's certificate. The root CA is kept offline because if it is compromised, everything it signed is untrusted.
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| CSR | Certificate signing request: what you send a CA to get a certificate (includes your public key, never your private key) |
| Self-signed | Signed by its own owner; fine for internal testing, triggers browser warnings publicly |
| Wildcard | *.example.com covers every subdomain one level deep (shop.example.com, not a.shop.example.com) |
| SAN | Subject alternative name: lists several specific names on one certificate |
| CRL | Certificate revocation list: a published list of revoked serial numbers |
| OCSP | Online check of one certificate's status in real time (faster than downloading a CRL) |
Trap: An expired certificate and a revoked certificate are different. Expired = past its end date. Revoked = cancelled early, usually because the private key was compromised.
Patches, updates, and version control SP-7 Sec+ 4.3, 1.2 OP:152
Most successful attacks exploit flaws that already have a patch . Patch management cycle:
1. Identify missing patches (vulnerability scan, vendor alerts). 2. Prioritize by severity (CVSS score) and how exposed the system is. 3. Test the patch on non-production systems. 4. Deploy during a maintenance window, through change management. 5. Verify it installed (rescan) and document it.
Version control (like Git) records every change, who made it, and when. Security benefits: you can roll back a bad change, audit who changed what, and compare versions to spot unauthorized edits.
Compensating controls: if a system cannot be patched (legacy medical or factory equipment), isolate it on its own segment and monitor it closely.
Trap: "Test first" applies to production systems. But for a critical, actively exploited flaw, the priority is to patch or mitigate fast , through an emergency change.
Penetration testing SP-8 Sec+ 5.5 OP:154
| Vulnerability scan | Penetration test | |
|---|---|---|
| Goal | Find and list known weaknesses | Exploit weaknesses to prove real impact |
| Method | Automated tool | Skilled humans plus tools |
| Risk to systems | Low | Higher; can disrupt |
| How often | Frequently (weekly, monthly) | Periodically (yearly, after big changes) |
Pen test steps: planning and rules of engagement (written permission, scope, times, what is off-limits) → reconnaissance → scanning → exploitation → post-exploitation (persistence, lateral movement, privilege escalation) → report with fixes → cleanup.
| Environment | Tester knows | Also called |
|---|---|---|
| Known environment | Everything (network maps, credentials) | White box |
| Partially known | Some information | Gray box |
| Unknown environment | Nothing; like an outside attacker | Black box |
| Reconnaissance | Meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Passive | Gathering information without touching the target | Reading the company website, social media, public records |
| Active | Directly interacting with the target | Port scanning the company's servers |
Teams: red = attackers, blue = defenders, purple = both working together to improve, white = referees. Bug bounty programs pay outside researchers who report flaws.
Trap: Without written authorization, a "pen test" is just an attack. Rules of engagement come first . Also, a credentialed scan logs in and finds more than a non-credentialed scan, which only sees what an outsider sees.
Cram sheet
Read this the morning of the test. Each row is a clue you will see in a question and the answer it points to.
| If the question says... | Think... |
|---|---|
| Locked out of your own files, ransom note | Availability (ransomware) |
| Proves the sender cannot deny it | Non-repudiation, private key signature |
| Who are you / what can you do / what did you do | Authentication / authorization / accounting |
| Never trust, always verify; every request checked | Zero Trust |
| Fake file or system nobody should touch | Honeyfile / honeypot (detects, does not prevent) |
| Spread across the network with no one clicking | Worm |
| Looked like a free game, opened a back door | Trojan / RAT |
| Waited until the admin was fired, then deleted data | Logic bomb |
| Hides deep in the OS with admin rights | Rootkit |
| Changes its code each infection | Polymorphic virus |
| No patch exists yet | Zero-day |
| ' OR 1=1 in a login field | SQL injection (fix: parameterized queries) |
| Script runs in other visitors' browsers | XSS |
| Spear phishing aimed at the CEO | Whaling |
| Phone call / text message | Vishing / smishing |
| Fake Wi-Fi with the coffee shop's name | Evil twin |
| Forced to an older protocol | Downgrade attack |
| Two inputs, same hash | Collision (birthday attack) |
| Customer always secures its own data and access | Shared responsibility model |
| Containers share the host... | Kernel |
| Restore = full + every daily tape | Incremental backup |
| Restore = full + latest tape only | Differential backup |
| Survives 2 disk failures | RAID 6 |
| How much data can we lose / how long can we be down | RPO / RTO |
| Encrypt so only Bob can read | Bob's public key |
| Sign so everyone knows Alice sent it | Alice's private key |
| Owner decides who gets access | DAC |
| Clearance labels decide | MAC |
| Job title decides | RBAC |
| Password + security question | Not MFA (both are "something you know") |
| Lets an app act for you without your password | OAuth (authorization) |
| Random value added before hashing | Salt (defeats rainbow tables) |
| Whole business keeps running vs. IT gets restored | BCP vs. DRP |
| First step after finding malware | Contain (isolate it) |
| Stops SQL injection against a website | WAF |
| Blocks by application, not just port | NGFW |
| Rules checked top-down, nothing matched | Implicit deny |
| Telnet / HTTP / FTP | SSH / HTTPS / SFTP |
| Alerts only, watches a copy of traffic | IDS |
| Inline, blocks | IPS |
| Real attack, no alarm | False negative (worst case) |
| Card number replaced by a vault lookup value | Tokenization |
| Message hidden inside a photo | Steganography |
| One password tried on many accounts | Password spraying |
| Stolen credentials from another site | Credential stuffing |
| Certificate cancelled early | Revoked (check CRL or OCSP) |
| Tester given full network maps | Known environment (white box) |
| Find weaknesses vs. exploit them | Vulnerability scan vs. penetration test |
Formulas to know:
Sources
- 2026-2027 Competitive Events Guidelines: Cybersecurity (state chapter posting of the national guidelines, updated August 2026): test areas, question counts, and study guide objectives. Opened November 19, 2026.
- CompTIA Security+ SY0-801 V8 Exam Objectives, document version 2.0: objective numbers used in the Sec+ tags.
- CompTIA Security+ V8 exam page: launch date (November 17, 2026) and domain weights.
| MBA Research performance indicators, 2026-2027 (Business Administration Core section, posted July 2026): codes and wording of the MBA Research PIs. All notes are written in original wording; no text is copied from these sources. |
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